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Several recent studies have suggested that there are two different ways in which a person can 
proceed when assessing the persuasiveness of a mathematical argument: by evaluating 
whether it is personally convincing, or by evaluating whether or not it is publicly acceptable. 
In this paper, using Toulmin’s (1958) argumentation scheme, we produce a more detailed 
theoretical classification of the ways in which participants can interpret a request to assess the 
persuasiveness of an argument. We suggest that there are (at least) five ways in which such a 
question can be interpreted. The classification is illustrated with data from a study that asked 
undergraduate students and research-active mathematicians to rate how persuasive they found 
a given argument. We conclude by arguing that researchers interested in mathematical 
conviction and proof validation need to be aware of the different ways in which participants 
can interpret questions about the persuasiveness of arguments, and that they must carefully 
control for these variations during their studies. 
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The issue of what types of arguments students find persuasive and convincing has been a 
recurring theme in the mathematics education literature. Mason, Burton, and Stacey (1982) 
placed conviction at the heart of mathematical practice by proposing that learners first need 
to convince themselves, then a friend, and finally an enemy. Harel and Sowder (1998) 
analysed the notion of conviction in depth, by publishing a taxonomy of ‘proof schemes’: the 
types of arguments that students use both to ascertain for themselves (to remove their own 
doubts) and to persuade others (to remove others’ doubts) about the truth of a statement. 
Other authors have suggested that these two processes may be disassociated: that the types of 
arguments that students find personally persuasive may not necessarily be the same types that 
they would use to persuade third parties such as their mathematics teachers or lecturers 
(Healy and Hoyles 2000; Mejia-Ramos and Tall 2005; Segal 2000; Raman 2002). In this 
paper we suggest that the notion of persuasion and conviction is yet more complicated than 
this two-way categorisation suggests. Here, we argue that there are (at least) five different 
interpretations that a participant may reasonably make when asked how persuasive they find 
a mathematical argument. 
 
Toulmin’s argumentation scheme 
To situate our proposed taxonomy of the ways in which participants may respond to 
questioning about how ‘persuaded’ or ‘convinced’ they are by a mathematical argument, we 
first introduce Toulmin’s (1958) argumentation scheme. Toulmin advocated an approach to 
analysing arguments that departed dramatically from traditional approaches to formal logic. 
He was less concerned with the logical validity of an argument, and more interested in the 
semantic content and structure in which it fits. This manner of analysing argumentation has 
become known as ‘informal logic’ in order to emphasise its differences from formal logic. 
 How persuaded are you? 
 3 
Toulmin’s scheme has six basic types of statement, each of which plays a different 
role in an argument. The conclusion (C) is the statement of which the arguer wishes to 
convince their audience. The data (D) are the foundations on which the argument is based, 
the relevant evidence for the claim. The warrant (W) justifies the connection between data 
and conclusion by, for example, appealing to a rule, a definition, or by making an analogy1. 
The warrant is supported by the backing (B), which presents further evidence. The modal 
qualifier (Q, henceforth qualifier) qualifies the conclusion by expressing degrees of 
confidence; and the rebuttal (R) potentially refutes the conclusion by stating the conditions 
under which it would not hold. Importantly, in any given argument, not all of these 
statements will necessarily be explicitly verbalised. These six components of an argument are 
linked together in the structure shown in Figure 1. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
In the field of mathematics education, many researchers have applied Toulmin’s 
scheme to analyse arguments constructed by students. However, it has become commonplace 
to use a reduced version of the scheme by omitting the qualifier and rebuttal. Krummheuer, 
for example, adopted this reduced version of the scheme to analyse pupil behaviour 
throughout his long programme of research on the development of collective argumentation 
practices in primary school classroooms (e.g. Krummheuer 1995, 2007). A similar stance has 
been adopted by researchers studying classroom interaction at the university level (Stephan 
and Rasmussen 2002), basic number skills (Evens and Houssart 2004), logical deduction 
(Hoyles and Küchemann 2002; Weber and Alcock 2005), geometry (Cabassut 2005; 
Pedemonte 2005), and general proof (Yackel 2001). Inglis, Mejia-Ramos and Simpson 
(2007) argued that without using Toulmin’s full scheme it may be difficult to model 
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accurately the full range of mathematical argumentation. They gave research-active 
mathematicians a series of conjectures, and asked them to decide whether or not the 
conjectures were true, and to provide proofs. It was found that these mathematicians regularly 
constructed arguments with non-deductive warrants in order to reduce rather than remove 
their doubts about a conjecture’s truth value. Inglis et al. (2007) pointed out that it would be 
impossible to model such arguments accurately without incorporating the qualifier 
component of Toulmin’s scheme. They concluded that (i) using the restricted version of 
Toulmin’s scheme in the manner adopted by earlier researchers reduces the range of 
mathematical arguments that can be successfully modelled; and (ii) rather than concentrating 
on the appropriateness of the warrants deployed by students, researchers should instead study 
the appropriateness of the warrant-qualifier pairings constructed in student argumentation. 
In this paper, we use Toulmin’s full scheme to derive a classification of the ways in 
which the question “how persuaded are you by this argument?” can be interpreted. We note 
that, as in the case of argument construction, a comprehensive study of argument evaluation 
cannot be conducted using a reduced version of the scheme. 
 
 How persuaded are you? 
Some previous researchers have studied the types and levels of conviction and persuasion 
students place in an argument simply by asking them (e.g. Mejia-Ramos and Tall 2005; Segal 
2000; Raman 2002). But what do students understand by such a question? We suggest that 
there are (at least) five distinct and reasonable ways of answering the question how 
persuaded are you by this argument? To demonstrate our typology in a general context, we 
introduce the following fictional day-to-day argument about train times: 
The last three times I have gone anywhere by train, I have arrived several hours late. So, it is 
certain that, when I go to the airport tomorrow, the train will be late. 
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------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
Using Toulmin’s (1958) layout we can model this argument by identifying its 
different types of statements (see Figure 2). We claim that a person evaluating how persuaded 
he or she is by this argument may focus on different parts and aspects of the argument. He or 
she may focus on: (i) the data of the given argument, and how significant/trustworthy it is; 
(ii) the likelihood of its conclusion; (iii) the strength of the warrant (and its associated 
backing); (iv) the given qualifier (and its associated rebuttal), and the extent to which this 
qualifier is appropriate considering the rest of the argument; and (v) the particular context in 
which the given argument may take place.  We now focus on each of these evaluation types  
in turn. 
 
Type 0 
One possible evaluation occurs when the participant focuses on the data of the given 
argument and evaluates the whole argument in terms of how strongly he or she trusts these 
data.  
One possibility is that the participant distrusts the data and projects these doubts onto 
his/her evaluation of the whole argument. For instance, in the train example someone may 
suspect that the arguer is lying about the irregularities of the three train trips mentioned. For 
that person, this argument could be rated as unpersuasive mainly because he or she considers 
its data unreliable.  
On the other hand, it is possible that someone’s feeling of affinity for the data would 
be so strong that he or she would feel persuaded by the argument without taking into account 
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how these data fit in the whole argument. For example, someone who has herself arrived 
several hours late in her last few train trips may find the argument persuasive mainly because 
of her empathy for its data.2 Such an evaluation may involve what is known in the 
psychology literature as myside bias, a tendency to evaluate data from one’s own perspective, 
having difficulty in decoupling one’s prior beliefs and opinions from the evaluation of 
evidence and arguments (Stanovich and West 2006). In this particular case, the evaluator 
could focus on the data and evaluate them in a manner biased towards his or her own 
opinions. These opinions and beliefs could then be projected on to the evaluation of the 
whole argument. 
 
Type 1 
Another way of evaluating this argument is by focusing on the likelihood of its conclusion 
alone. In the train example, someone focusing on the argument’s conclusion (i.e. “the train to 
the airport will be late tomorrow”) may report being highly persuaded by the argument, since 
he or she knows that scheduled track repairs in the vicinity of the airport will indeed delay 
trains that day. Alternatively, some people may not feel persuaded by the argument as, 
knowing that the train to the airport is the most reliable journey in the local train network, 
they expect this train to be on time.  
In these two cases, evaluators would have reported the qualifier component of an 
entirely separate, and self-constructed, argument to that which they were asked to evaluate; 
the only similarities with the original argument being that they shared conclusions. In other 
words, in these cases the evaluators have their own evidence and reasons for 
trusting/distrusting the conclusion, and this information is projected onto the evaluation of the 
whole argument. However, as in Type 0 evaluations, it may also be the case that evaluators’ 
 How persuaded are you? 
 7 
uninformed intuition regarding the argument’s conclusion, and not explicit information 
external to the argument, influence their reported level of persuasion. 
  
Type 2 
Another possible evaluation occurs when participants focus their attention on the warrant of 
the argument (with its associated backing). Unlike the data and the conclusion, the warrant of 
the argument is inextricably linked to other parts of the argument: it is a statement linking the 
data and the conclusion. Furthermore, any question regarding the trustworthiness of the 
warrant would lead to an evaluator querying its (explicit or implicit) backing and to consider 
possible rebuttals: if the warrant is appropriately backed and accepts no rebuttals (or only 
extraordinary ones), then one would say that the argument strongly supports the conclusion; 
but if the warrant is not satisfactorily backed and one can think of critical rebuttals, one 
would say that the warrant weakly supports the conclusion. Therefore, focusing on the 
warrant of an argument, a person may evaluate the strength with which it links the data with 
the conclusion, taking into account its backing and possible rebuttals. In this case, a 
participant’s evaluation of the whole argument essentially consists of completing this core 
part of the given argument (data-warrant-conclusion) with what he or she believes is the 
appropriate qualifier for the argument, and then reporting this qualifier as his or her level of 
persuasion in the whole argument.  
In the train example, a person might reply to the request of stating his or her level of 
persuasion in the whole argument by saying that (given the data, implicit warrant and the 
possible rebuttals associated with it) it is reasonable to reach the conclusion with a plausible 
qualifier. It is important to note that in this case the person is paying little or no attention to 
the absolute qualifier that was actually given in the train argument; he or she would be 
reporting what they believed to be the appropriate qualifier. It is also important to note that 
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this way of evaluating the argument differs from Type 1 evaluations: a Type 2 evaluation 
focuses on the given warrant and takes into account certain information from the argument 
that is associated with that warrant, whereas a Type 1 evaluation focuses on its conclusion 
and may involve the (possibly implicit) construction of an entirely new argument. 
 
Type 3 
In contrast to the previous types of evaluation, a participant’s attention may be drawn to the 
qualifier given in the argument (and its associated rebuttal). A Type 3 evaluation occurs 
when the evaluator decides to what extent he or she believes that the given qualifier is 
appropriate, considering the rest of the argument.  
In the train example, someone may state that he or she is not at all persuaded by the 
argument as, although it might be reasonable to be worried about the possible lateness of the 
train based on prior experience, it is completely inappropriate to pair such a warrant with an 
absolute qualifier as the arguer appears to have done.  Unlike a Type 2 evaluation, where the 
evaluator decides what type of qualifier would be appropriate given the rest of the argument, 
in a Type 3 evaluation the issue is whether the given qualifier is appropriate on account of the 
rest of the argument. It is clear that one could simultaneously consider an argument to be 
Type 2 persuasive but Type 3 unpersuasive. Indeed, believing (based on the prior experience 
cited in the argument) that the train would plausibly – but not certainly – be late could lead 
someone to such a judgement: they would assess the appropriate qualifier to be relatively 
high (i.e. Type 2 persuasive), but the qualifier as given in the argument to be inappropriate 
(i.e. Type 3 unpersuasive). 
 
Type 4 
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Finally, instead of focusing on a particular part of the argument, the participant may attend to 
the context in which the argument is situated, and the kinds of arguments that are admissible 
in such contexts. In this case, when asked how persuaded they are by a given argument, 
participants may answer by considering how acceptable the argument would be in a particular 
context. It is well known in the context of jurisprudence that some arguments, no matter how 
persuasive, are not admissible in court. In England and Wales, for example, a prosecuting 
lawyer may not refer to a defendant’s criminal record during the case. An argument based on 
such data may well carry an extremely high qualifier, but in the given context it is 
inadmissible. Naturally what constitutes an admissible argument will depend on the particular 
context: what is admissible in a criminal court is different from what is admissible in a civil 
court which, in turn, is different from what is admissible during an argument in a pub.  
The example of the train argument may well be admissible when talking informally, 
but if one were attempting to convince one’s departmental finance officer to issue an advance 
to pay for a taxi fare to the airport, it could be considered inadmissible. Such matters are 
governed by a set of rules which state what kinds of data, warrants, backings, qualifiers and 
rebuttals can be used in an admissible argument; and a hunch about the possible lateness of 
the train is unlikely to meet these rules. 
The five types of persuasion we have discussed are summarised in Table 1. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
Illustrating the typology in mathematics 
Our primary aim in the second half of the paper is to illustrate the applicability of this 
typology to the evaluation of mathematical arguments. A second aim is to provide ‘existence 
proofs’ of each of the types: to show that the different types of evaluations can be, and are, 
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made by mathematicians and students when evaluating mathematical arguments (or, at least, 
that mathematicians and students claim to be making evaluations of each type). To 
accomplish these aims, we draw on evaluations of a heuristic argument collected recently as 
part of a study on the role of authority in mathematical argumentation (Inglis and Mejia-
Ramos 2006). The argument used in the study was given by Gowers (2006) and supports the 
conjecture that there are one million consecutive sevens somewhere in the decimal expansion 
of π: 
All the evidence is that there is nothing very systematic about the sequence of digits of π. 
Indeed, they seem to behave much as they would if you just chose a sequence of random 
digits between 0 to 9. This hunch sounds vague, but it can be made precise as follows: there 
are various tests that statisticians perform on sequences to see whether they are likely to have 
been generated randomly, and it looks very much as though the sequences of digits of π 
would pass these tests. Certainly the first few million do. One obvious test is to see whether 
any short sequence of digits, such as 137, occurs with about the right frequency in the long 
term. In the case of the string 137 one would expect it to crop up about 1/1000th of the time 
in the decimal expansion of π. 
Experience strongly suggests that short sequences in the decimal expansion of the 
irrational numbers that crop up in nature, such as π, e or √2, do occur with the correct 
frequencies. And if that is so, then we would expect a million sevens in the decimal expansion 
of π about 10-1000000 of the time – and it is of course, no surprise, that we will not actually be 
able to check that directly. And yet, the argument that it does eventually occur, while not a 
proof, is pretty convincing. (p. 194). 
The two stages of this argument are shown graphically, using Toulmin’s (1958) scheme, in 
Figure 3. 
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------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
Our sample consisted of two groups, undergraduate students and research-active 
mathematicians. Participants completed the task online (for a discussion on the reliability of 
internet studies see, for example, Krantz and Dalal 2000). The undergraduate students were 
studying at one of four highly-regarded UK universities, and were asked to participate by 
means of an email from their departmental secretary. The email explained the task and asked 
them to click through to the experimental website should they wish to participate. The 
research-active mathematicians were recruited in two different ways. Some were recruited in 
a similar manner as the undergraduates, via emails from their departmental secretaries; others 
were recruited through an advertisement posted on a mathematics research newsgroup. In the 
study, participants were presented with Gowers’ (2006) argument, and were asked to state to 
what extent they were persuaded by it, using either a five point Likert scale or a continuous 
0–100 scale (depending on whether participants took part in the pilot or main study). In 
addition, participants were invited to leave explanatory comments on their reported level of 
persuasion. It is these comments that we use in the following sections to illustrate our 
theoretical classification.  
Our focus in the analysis of the extracts is on the aspects of the argument which 
participants focus upon when explaining their evaluations. While we accept that the full 
complexity of participants’ judgements may not be fully reflected by such short explanations 
(especially given factors such as myside bias, Stanovich and West 2006), we nevertheless 
believe that focussing on these reported comments will allow us to illustrate the utility of the 
 How persuaded are you? 
 12 
typology for researchers interested in how mathematicians and students become persuaded by 
mathematical arguments. 
We should emphasise that the classification we introduce in this paper is derived from 
a theoretical analysis of Toulmin’s (1958) argumentation scheme; an analysis that considers 
the type of statement upon which participants may focus their attention when asked to 
evaluate their degree of persuasion in an argument. The extracts reported in the following 
sections, therefore, should be viewed as existence proofs of each of the categories, not as a 
dataset from which we are attempting to generalise. 
 
Type 0 
When asked to evaluate and explain their level of persuasion in Gowers’ argument regarding 
the decimal expansion of π, one research-active mathematician wrote:  
This is not an argument. To be more precise, in the statement no concrete evidence is 
presented. He only explains how the statistical evidence could look like, but does not specify 
the empirical results of the tests. (Researcher). 
In this case, the evaluator’s explanation of his or her rating clearly focused on the data of the 
first stage of the argument. This researcher’s comment concentrated on the “statistical 
evidence” of the argument, reporting dissatisfaction with the lack of concreteness of its 
presentation. Although this factor may be related to concerns that the researcher may have 
had with the warrant and backing of the argument, it is clear that their focus was on the data: 
to persuade this participant, at a minimum the data of the argument would need to be 
presented in a considerably more formal fashion. 
 
Type 1 
Type 1 evaluations were not uncommon among participants’ comments. For example, one 
research-active mathematician wrote: 
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Normalcy of (the digits) of pi is not unreasonable given almost all reals are normal. 
(Researcher). 
This researcher’s comment focused on the conclusion of the first stage of the argument (i.e. 
“π is normal”), and reported the qualifier component (i.e. “not unreasonable”) of an entirely 
separate, and self-constructed, argument to that which participants were asked to evaluate. He 
or she did not mention the data, warrant, backing or rebuttal given in Gowers’ argument, and 
instead appears to have constructed a separate argument that merely shares a conclusion with 
the given argument. The data (“almost all reals are normal”), implicit warrant, and implicit 
backing in this new argument are entirely distinct, and the evaluator reported the new 
argument’s qualifier by stating that the conclusion is “not unreasonable”. 
Another example of a Type 1 evaluation came from the following student: 
I am mainly not persuaded because I have seen a formula which can calculate the n-th digit of 
pi, suggesting that is not a random series of numbers. (Undergraduate Student). 
Again, the student’s comment focused on the conclusion of the first stage of Gowers’ 
argument, and evaluated the qualifier of an entirely new argument; the data, warrant and 
backing of the given argument are not taken into account. Of course, the construction of an 
entirely new argument – necessary for a Type 1 evaluation – would only be possible if the 
participant had a strong background knowledge of the domain in which the argument is 
situated. 
 
Type 2 
The following response typifies a Type 2 evaluation of Gowers’ argument: 
The evidence lends decent weight to the conjecture; but naturally as proof is impossible it is 
unrealistic to assume certainty. (Undergraduate Student). 
Here the student seemed to be suggesting that the evidence presented – the data, warrant and 
backing – indicates that the conclusion may be true, but that any stronger qualifier would be 
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inappropriate (possibly considering the existence of rebuttals). This student has considered 
the warrant of the argument (with its associated data, backing, and possible rebuttals) and has 
decided that he or she would be willing to pair a qualifier with it that “lends decent weight” 
to the conclusion. Characteristically for Type 2 evaluators, this student does not seem to be 
addressing the argument’s given qualifier; this comment only refers to the new qualifiers that 
he or she considers appropriate given the rest of the argument. 
 
Type 3 
When participants were asked to evaluate Gowers’ argument there were many examples of 
Type 3 evaluations: 
Despite the statistical evidence that pi is a ‘normal number’ (only testing short sequences) 
there could still be some subtle numerical invariant that prevents this particular very long 
sequence from occurring. (Researcher). 
In this comment, the researcher first evaluated the link between the data of the first stage of 
the argument and its conclusion, and then centred on an unmentioned rebuttal (the possibility 
of a “subtle numerical invariant”), suggesting that Gowers’ given qualifier was inappropriate.  
A similar evaluation was reported in the following comment by an undergraduate student: 
 The reasoning is flawed in moving from talking of experience strongly suggesting ‘short 
sequences’ occur in naturally occurring irrational numbers to saying that ‘a million sevens’ is 
likely to occur. Of course, their definition of a ‘short sequence’ isn't given, but I dare guess it 
is much fewer numbers than a million. (Undergraduate Student). 
Again, in this case the student criticised the strength with which the data is claimed to support 
the argument’s conclusion, focusing on what he or she considered to be an inappropriate 
qualifier. In this comment, the student did not report the extent to which he or she believed 
that the given evidence supports the conclusion; instead they seemed to be more concerned 
about the relatively high qualifier given in the original argument. 
 How persuaded are you? 
 15 
In both these extracts the evaluators exhibited the hallmarks of a Type 3 evaluation; 
they explained that they were not persuaded by the argument as a whole because they did not 
accept that the given warrant (and associated backing) justifies the given qualifier (and 
associated rebuttal).  
 
Type 4 
A Type 4 evaluation can clearly be seen in this researcher’s response: 
The argument hinges on a precise notion of randomness in the digits of pi, which may be 
plausible, but hasn't been proven. If a manuscript that made an analogous argument came to 
me for refereeing, I’d recommend it be rejected for lack of mathematical rigour. However, if 
someone wanted to generate ‘good pseudorandom’ bits from the digits of pi for a casual 
computer program (i.e., not one on which lives or property crucially depend), I’d say Gowers’ 
argument would justify the strategy. (Researcher) 
Here the evaluator suggested that in the context of an academic mathematics journal he or she 
would deem the argument to be inadmissible, but that in a different context, where one 
merely needed to generate some random numbers, it would be admissible. This position was 
clarified still further by noting that in yet another context – where the random numbers were 
a matter of life or death – then perhaps the argument would again struggle to meet the 
requirements of admissibility.  
Within the context of mathematics education Type 4 evaluations are very important, 
and an ability to understand successfully the different rules of admissibility for different 
contexts may be a hard skill for students to develop. These rules undoubtedly vary between 
educational levels – the type of justification required at school level mathematics is typically 
very different from that required at university level – but may also vary between courses at a 
single level. For example, the types of argument which are admissible to justify the rules of 
integration may be very different if the notion of integral is studied during a real analysis 
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course compared with during an applied fluid dynamics course. In the former a formal 
derivation from the definition of, for example, the Riemann integral, may be necessary, 
whereas in the latter a statement of the result might be sufficient. 
 
Mixing the types 
Sometimes participants in empirical research studies may give evaluations of different types 
in the same response: multiple interpretations of the question may lead to answers with 
multiple layers. This, for example, is how one mathematics researcher responded when asked 
to evaluate Gowers’ (2006) argument: 
Purely logically on the basis of the evidence presented, I am not persuaded at all. However, I 
am aware that there is a substantial body of research (rather more formal than the waffle 
above) specifically addressing equidistribution of digit sequences of pi. So I moved from the 
most sceptical to the next category by way of combining that knowledge with the information 
above. (Researcher) 
Here the evaluator explicitly noted that he or she was not persuaded by the data, warrant and 
backing of the argument: they were completely Type 2 unpersuaded. However, the researcher 
claimed that they were somewhat Type 1 persuaded on account of his or her background 
knowledge about the digit sequences of  π. Understandably, these differing interpretations 
gave this participant some difficulty when asked to rate his or her level of persuasion on a 
Likert scale. However, the proposed typology can help us to make sense of this participant’s 
multi-layered written comment. 
 
One question, five ways of answering 
Earlier researchers have studied two different ways of evaluating a given argument and the 
two corresponding levels of persuasiveness reported by their participants. This led them to 
establish a distinction between a private and a public, or internal and external, sense of 
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conviction. Raman (2003, 320), for example, differentiated between private and public 
arguments and their corresponding senses of conviction (see also Raman 2002): 
By ‘private argument’ I mean, ‘an argument which engenders understanding’, and by ‘public’ 
I mean ‘an argument with sufficient rigor for a particular mathematical community’. 
In our terms, Raman was noting the differences between Type 4 persuasion and persuasion of 
Types 0–3. The usefulness of this two-way distinction in mathematics education lies in the 
importance of Type 4 evaluations in mathematical argumentation. Mathematical proof seems 
to set argument admissibility in mathematical practice aside from admissibility standards in 
other contexts, making students’ beliefs of what constitutes a valid mathematical proof, and 
the ways in which these beliefs influence their reported level of persuasion in a given 
argument, an interesting topic of study among mathematics educators.  
However, we suggest that a finer typology of persuasiveness may be helpful: whereas 
earlier researchers have spoken only of a ‘private’ sense of conviction, we have demonstrated 
that, in the case of argument validation, there are (at least) four different ways in which such 
an evaluation may be conducted in a ‘private’ fashion. Similarly, there is not simply one 
variety of ‘public’, or Type 4, persuasion. Each particular context brings with it its own 
particular rules of admissibility, and these rules vary greatly between contexts. Even in the 
particular context of mathematics, requirements for rigour alter greatly according to 
educational level, mathematical subject and other particular circumstances of each 
evaluation. 
Segal (2000) used two different questions to study this distinction between a private 
and public sense of conviction. Following Mason et al. (1982), she asked her participants 
whether or not a given argument convinced them personally, and whether or not the argument 
would persuade “one’s enemies (as opposed to one’s friends, or oneself)” (Segal 2000, 199). 
It is unclear whether a participant’s response to the first question involves an evaluation of 
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Type 0, 1, 2 or 3. Furthermore, a participant’s response to the second question (arguably 
related to Type 4 evaluations) is, of course, dependant upon in which context the participant 
situates their enemy, and what type of evaluation is expected from that enemy. 
 Therefore, this finer typology may be used by both teachers and researchers not only 
to better assess students’ and participants’ reported levels of persuasion in a given 
mathematical argument, but also to design specific questioning strategies to incline students 
and participants towards making the teacher’s or researcher’s desired type of evaluation. 
 
Using the typology: an example from the literature 
In this section we give a specific example of a piece of analysis from the mathematics 
education literature to illustrate the utility of the typology proposed here. During their study 
of the proof conceptions of school children, Coe and Ruthven (1994) looked at students’ 
investigative and problem solving strategies. Here we concentrate on one particular extract 
from an interview transcript reported by Coe and Ruthven. Whilst working on a problem 
regarding the sums of diagonals in a number square, Bill, a 17 year old student, checked that 
a statement he was investigating was true for six cases, and then said that it was “safe to 
make a conjecture”. The interviewer pressed him by asking “what sort of percentage certainty 
would you put behind that, say, if I forced you on that?” Bill replied by estimating he had a 
“percentage certainty” in the “high nineties”. 
What has happened here? Bill and the interviewer were discussing the persuasiveness 
of an argument with an inductive warrant (which consisted of the numerical evaluation of six 
examples). The interviewer pressed Bill with an ambiguous question, by asking the 
“percentage certainty” he would be willing to “put behind that”. One interpretation is that, 
when pressed, Bill conducted a Type 2 evaluation. He evaluated what sort of qualifier he was 
willing to pair with the data, warrant and conclusion of the given (self-constructed) argument, 
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and made the decision that he was willing to deploy a high (but non-absolute) qualifier. (Seen 
in this light, Bill’s behaviour closely matches that of the highly successful research students 
interviewed by Inglis et al. 2007). Coe and Ruthven (1994), however, appear to have 
interpreted Bill’s response in a different way, as a Type 4 evaluation. They wrote that Bill’s 
“certainty appears to be gained just by checking a relatively small number of cases” (50), and 
used the episode as evidence for the claim that “students’ proof strategies were primarily and 
predominantly empirical” (52, our emphasis). Of course, it may well be that Bill was 
conducting a Type 4 evaluation of his self-constructed argument: there are certainly many 
studies which corroborate Coe and Ruthven’s finding that students often think empirical 
evidence can form admissible proofs (e.g. Balacheff 1987, Harel and Sowder 1998). 
However, when seen within the typology set out in this paper, Coe and Ruthven’s 
interpretation of this interview evidence is, at best, arguable. 
We suggest that an awareness of the typology presented in this paper could help 
researchers conducting studies on mathematical conviction to deploy careful questioning 
strategies to increase the likelihood of accurately interpreting their interviewee’s behaviour. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Researchers interested in assessment have, for some time, been aware that there may be a gap 
between test designers’ interpretation of a given question and the interpretation of those who 
respond to the question. In their study of 11 and 12 year old children’s responses to national 
test items, Cooper and Harries (2002) found that students interpretations of how much 
realism to use in their answers when answering ‘realistic’ mathematical questions differ from 
those of the questions’ designers. We suggest that teachers and researchers who are interested 
in what types of mathematical argument students find persuasive need to have awareness of 
the differing ways in which their questions may be interpreted. Similarly, the many 
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researchers who have studied the manner in which students and mathematicians validate 
proofs (e.g. Selden and Selden 2003; Weber, forthcoming) also need to be aware that requests 
to ‘evaluate’ a purported proof may lead to differing interpretations from different 
participants.  
In this paper we have proposed that there are (at least) five different ways in which 
participants in research studies can reasonably interpret a request to evaluate their level of 
conviction or persuasion in an argument. The first two types that we have described revolve 
around a participant evaluating a particular part of the argument (data or conclusion) and 
paying little or no attention to the other parts; two other types involve the participant 
evaluating the core part of the argument and either completing it with what they believe is an 
appropriate qualifier, or assessing whether or not the given qualifier is appropriate; a fifth 
type is related to one particular context in which the argument may take place and the 
participant’s evaluation of whether or not the given argument would be admissible in such 
context. By using Toulmin’s full scheme, it is possible to distinguish clearly between these 
different types of argument evaluation. Given these different ways, we suggest that the 
empirical researcher must design their methodological instruments carefully to determine 
which question participants are responding to, and take into account these different types of 
evaluations in their theorisation of students’ reported levels of persuasion.  
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Notes 
1. Toulmin’s (1958) use of the word ‘warrant’ is not identical to the way in which the term 
has been used by some mathematics education literature. Rodd (2000), for example, saw a 
warrant as removing uncertainty, whereas Toulmin was more flexible, accepting that a 
warrant can be qualified so as to merely reduce uncertainty. 
 
2. Elena Nardi has pointed out to us that this may be the type of persuasion enlisted by 
propagandists who use sensationalist data in the hope that the affinity of the audience for 
these data will sway them to support whatever conclusion he or she wishes to draw.
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Figure Captions 
1. The layout of Toulmin’s (1958) argumentation scheme, showing data (D), warrant (W), 
backing (B), qualifier (Q), rebuttal (R) and conclusion (C). 
2. Late-train argument modelled using Toulmin’s (1958) scheme, with inferred warrant, 
backing and rebuttal components (the inferred components are italicised). 
3. Two stages of Gowers’ (2006) argument modelled using Toulmin’s (1958) scheme, with 
inferred components italicised. (A number is said to be normal if its digits show a 
random distribution). 
 
Table Caption 
1.  A summary of the types of persuasiveness identified in this paper, expressed using 
Toulmin’s (1958) scheme. 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Table 1. 
 
 
